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NOTE AND COMMENT
Pr=TY ol CONTRACT -AND ToRT Li.i~siTY.-Two parties, A and B, make
a contract whereby B undertakes to perform certain services for A. He
performs his task in a negligent manner, and as a consequence C, a third
party, suffers injury. Has C rights against B?
No one disputes the soundness of the general proposition that to recover
for the consequences of a negligent act the plaintiff must be one to whom
the actor owed a duty to be careful. (See Lord Esher in Le Lievre v. Gould
[1893], x Q. B. D. 491, 497, and Mitchell, J., in Akers v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
58 Minn. 54o, 544). Subject to exceptions not important here, C, a stranger
to the contract, gains no rights from it. That transaction is as to him res
inter alios acta, But if C's rights are not enlarged by the consensual transaction between A and B, they surely are not restricted by it. For a full
discussion of the subject, going beyond the range of this note, see F. H.
Bbhlen, "Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort," 44 Aimi. L. RzG.
(n. s.) 20*, 273, 337.) To affect a little more law Latin, res inter alios acto
alteri nocere non debet. C's rights will depend on the general rules of tori
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liability, and may even be broader than obligations owed A by B under the
contract. (See, for instance, Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beach Imp. Co., 174
N. Y. 3To; Junkermnann v. Jankelson, 213 N. Y. 405; L. R. A. i915 F 700
and note.) If A hired B to drive his delivery truck, and in the course*of
the business B carelessly ran over C, no one would doubt B's liability. The
case seems equally clear for C where the contract between A and B calls
for the doing.of something to C, performing a surgical operation upon him,
for instance. If B does it carelessly and injures C, C, may recover. DuBois
v. Decker, 13o N. Y. 325; Gladwell v. Steggall, 5 Bing. (N. C.) 733. So if
A pays the B railroad to carry C, Seybolt v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 95 N. Y.
562, or his baggage, Marshall v. York, etc., Ry. Co., ii C. B. 655, and person
or property is hurt, C may recover, though a stranger to the contract.
Clearly C should recover, for the defendant would be made liable for his
carelessness, even where no contract existed. Becker v. Janinski, i5 N. Y.
S. 675; SHEARMAN AND RnD.nmED oN NLIGNCr, Ed. 6, § 6o4.
In general, the law imposes no duty to act affirmatively to benefit a
stranger. But there are plenty of instances in the books wherb one who,
though not obliged to act, undertakes to do so, and does it carelessly, is
liable for the injuries he causes. (Not for failing to confer a benefit which
he has agreed, without consideration, to grant, but for the careless act he
does which causes harm. See Gill v. Middletin, io5 Mass. 477; Black v.
N. Y., etc., R. Co., I93 Mass. 448.) The plaintiff's rights are no less, surely,
because this careless act was also - violation of a contract between the actor
and some third party. These are but instances of the general rule of liability for consequences of negligent acts. The defendant -is liable if, as a
man of reasonable prudence, he should have foreseen the likelihood of danger to others in the act he did and at the time at which he did it. What
a person may reasonably anticipate is important in considering whether he
has been negligent. 'The duty to take care is owed to persons within the
probable range of the forces he sets in motion. Blackburn, J., in Smith v.
L. & S. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 14. This ought to be equally true whether
the act done be to shoot a gun, wield a scalpel, or to disseminate information. "When a responsible defendant seeks to escape from liability for an
act which he had noticed was likely to cause temporal damage to another,
and which has caused such damage in fact, he must show a justification."
Mr. Justice Holmes in 8 HAav. L. Rv., on page 9.
If all this is so, the recent New York case of Glanzer v. Shepard, 233
N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275, is unusual only in the neat way in which facts
presented the question for decision and the particularly straightforward and
understanding manner in which the court, speaking through Cardozo, J.,
met the issue. The facts may be put in the terms of the hypothetical case
at the beginning of this discussion. A employed B, who was in business as
a public weigher, to weigh a quantity of beans; payment for the service
was made by A. B' knew that C had purchased te beans from A, and at
A's request furnished C a duplicate copy of the weight certificate. The
weight was incorrectly reported, owing to negligence on B's part. C paid
A for the beans the amount called for by the weight shown in the certifi-
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cate, and upon discovering that he had paid for more beans than he received
sued B for the difference in value between what he got and what he was
supposed to have received according to the certificate. The court held that
he was entitled to recover on the ground of violation of a duty imposed'by
law. "Diligence was owing, not only to him who ordered, but to him also
who relied."
It could hardly be claimed, however, that the law has reached a state
of logical consistency in the application of the basic rules regarding negligence. Instance the almost innumerable cases on the liability of a manufacturer of a chattel whose negligence in its making has caused injury to the
consumer for whose use it was made. Starting out by denying liability,
courts have given a consumer increasing protection by building up exceptions while still rendering lip service to the former rule. There is a full
discussion of the origin, and development of this doctrine and a criticism
thereof in the articles by Professor Bohlen, supra. Only recently has this
protection been based on fundamental principles of tort liability. Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, L. P. A. 1916 F 696; commented
upon in 2g HAnv. L. R1v. 866. And we still have enunciation of the old
rule and its exceptions by courts of authority and learning. Pitman v. Lynn
Gas and Elect. Co. (Mass.), 135 N. X_ 223; Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.
v. Cannon (Tenn.), 178 S. W. ioog; the latter commented upon in 14 MICE.
L. RXV- 164.
Closer to the situation presented in Glanzer v. Shepard are those cases
where B has been employed under contract to furnish information to A,
and where C has relied to his damage on the information that B has negligently furnished. Authority says that C cannot recover. Some of the
decisions could easily be placed on the ground that B did not know nor
could he be expected to know that C would relyl on his statements. Savings
Bank v. Ward, xoo U. S. x95. In others, however, B knew that strangers
to the contract would be influenced by the information rendered to C. Landell v. Lybrand (Pa.), 1o7 Atl. 783; comment in 29 YALZ L. JouR. 234; Le
Lievre v. Gould [x893], i Q. B. D. 491. In some instances there was even
shown a custom to this effect. Gordon v.: Livingston, 12 Mo. App. 267;
Kahl v. Love, 37 N. J. L. 5. Cf, as to abstractor, Anderson v. Spriestersbach, 69 Wash. 393, 42 L. R. A. (n. s.) 176 and note.
Stress is laid, in the opinions, upon the necessity of a duty between the
parties before recovery can be had by' one for consequences of negligent acts
of the other. Then it seems to be assumed, rather than proved, that there
is no duty, except to a party to the contract, other than that to refrain from
intentional harm. This is a hasty assumption. Professor Bohlen suggests
that perhaps analogies of the law of deceit and high regard to the freedom
of speech have contributed to the result (page 373 of the articles referred
to). Perhaps so; though it is to be noted that the law of deceit itself is
developing in the direction of stricter liability. See Williston, "Liability for
'Honest Misrepresentation," 24 H1Rv. L. Rev. 415. And immunity for the
defendant here cannot rest upon the casual nature of the service rendered.
Surely a public accountant, weigher or abstractor would resent an imputa-
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